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ABSTRACT 
Using the February 2016 federal district court ruling in Fields v. City if Philadelphia as an 
analytical springboard, this Article examines growing judicial recognition of a qualified 
First Amendment right to record images of police working in public places. The Article 
argues that Judge Mark Kearney erred in Fields by requiring that citizens must intend to 
challenge or criticize police, via either spoken words or expressive conduct, in order for 
the act of recording to constitute "speech" under the First Amendment. It asserts that 
a mere intent to observe police-not to challenge or criticize them-suffices. It then 
also explores how recording falls within the scope of what some scholars call "speech­
facilitating conduct." Additionally, the Article criticizes the district court's view in Fields, 
as well as that of the Southern District ofN ew York in 2015, suggesting that the right to 
record is possessed only by journalists, not by all citizens. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2016, a federal district court in Fields v. City if Philadelphia1 
held there is no First Amendment' right to record images of police performing 
duties in public places, "absent any criticism or challenge to police conduct."3 Spe­
cifically, U.S. District Judge Mark Kearney found "no basis to craft a new First 
Amendment right based solely on 'observing and recording' without expressive 
conduct,"4 and he concluded that "photographing police is not, as a matter of law, 
expressive activity."5 
The court reasoned that the two plaintiffs in Fields lost under this standard 
because they "essentially concede[ d] they spoke no words or conduct expressing 
criticism of the police before or during their image capture."6 The court ex­
plained that the intent of Richard Fields, a Temple University student, in using 
"his cell phone to photograph approximately twenty police officers standing 
outside a home hosting a party,"7 was merely to take "a picture of an 'interesting' 
and 'cool' scene."8 Similarly, the intent of plaintiff Amanda Geraci, who vide­
otaped "a public protest against hydraulic fracturing,"9 was simply to serve as a 
"legal observer''10 and "to observe only."11 
Thus, because the intent of Fields and Geraci was neither to challenge 
nor to criticize the police actions they recorded, and because both silently 
1. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19,
2016).
2. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-one years ago through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local
government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. Fields, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *2 (emphasis added). 
4. Id. at *3.
5. Id.at*19.
6. Id. at *12. 
7. Id.at*4.
8. Id. at *22. 
9. Id. at*6.
10. Id. at *6.
11. Id. at *22.
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filmed rather than spoke up, 12 their First Amendment speech claims failed. This 
result is, perhaps, more disturbing for Geraci, who claims an officer physically 
stopped her from recording as she moved closer to film police arresting a pro­
testor.13 
In the court's view, however, the silent conduct of recording only equates to 
speech under the First Amendment ifit constitutes symbolic expression, such as, 
he wrote, "picketing, armband-wearing, flag-waving and flag-burning."14 The 
test for symbolic expression, fashioned four-plus decades ago by the U.S. Su­
preme Court in Spence v. Washington, 15 requires both "an intent to convey a par­
ticularized message" and a great likelihood "that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it."16 
In a nutshell, because neither Fields nor Geraci intended to convey a partic­
ular message when they recorded images, as required under the first prong of 
Spence, they did not engage in expressive conduct. At a more granular level, the 
twin acts of pushing a record button on a smartphone and holding the device aleft to 
capture images of police are, in Judge Kearney's estimation, merely conduct, not 
speech. He reasoned, in applying Spence, that:17 
Fields and Geraci cannot meet the burden of demonstrating their tak­
ing, or attempting to take, pictures with no further comments or con­
duct is "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication" to be 
deemed expressive conduct. Neither Fields nor Geraci direct us to 
facts showing at the time they took or wanted to take pictures, they 
asserted anything to anyone. There is also no evidence any of the of­
ficers understood them as communicating any idea or message.18 
On March 14, 2016, Judge Kearney affirmed his prior ruling on Amanda 
Geraci's First Amendment claim in Fields, making it final.19 The judge reiterated 
in his March decision that "[ w ]e have not seen, and counsel has not shown us, 
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Fields, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *6 (providing specifically that the officer 
"'attacked her' by physically restraining her against a pillar and preventing her from videotaping the
arrest''). 
14. Id. at *10.
15. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
16. Id. at 410-411. 
17. Judge Kearney wrote that "[e]xpressive conduct exists where 'an intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those 
who viewed it."' Fields, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *10 (quoting Heffernan v. City of
Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2015)).
18. Fields, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at*ll.
19. Geraci v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-5264, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32146, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
14, 2016). 
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any court extending the First Amendment rights to speech to include silent obser­
vation without expressing any challenge to the police."20 When it comes to 
achieving First Amendment status for recording images of police, then, silence is 
anything but golden in the Keystone State. 
This Article critiques the February 2016 opinion in Fields v. City if Phila­
delphia. It argues the ruling is problematic for at least four reasons. First, as Part I 
illustrates, Fields is out of step with a growing body of cases from outside the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the circuit in which Judge Kearney sits) 
that recognizes a qualified First Amendment right to record images of police do­
ing their jobs in public venues, regardless of the intent of the recorder.21 
Second, Part II argues22 that Fields ignores the fact that pushing a record 
button on a smartphone to capture video amounts to what Wesley Campbell, ex­
ecutive director of the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, recently called 
"speech-facilitating conduct."23 By way of a timely analogy, just as the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in December 2015 recognized that the process 
of tattooing-not simply the final product of the tattoo-merits First Amend­
ment protection,24 so too is the process of recording, videotaping, or photo­
graphing images-not merely the ultimate images-protected speech. 
Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded in 
2012 that "[t]he act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily in­
cluded within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights as a 
corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording."25 This comports 
with Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat's more general observation in 2015 that "in­
formation gathering is necessary to produce speech,"26 given that the act of video 
recording is tantamount to gathering information in the form of visual images. 
Part III then analyzes the court's focus in Fields on a person's expressed in­
tent or purpose when recording as providing the critical key for deciding if the act 
of recording may enter through the otherwise locked door of First Amendment 
protection as speech.27 In the process, Part III asserts that the court's rule in 
Fields embodies unconstitutional viewpoint-based censorship. 
20. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part IL
23. Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016).
24. Buehrlev. City of Key West, 813 F.3d 973,976 (11th Cir. 2015).
25. ACLU oflll. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583,595 (7th Cir 2012).
26. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1029, 1052 (2015).
27. See iiyra Part III.
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Next, Part IV criticizes another facet of the Fields opinion.28 Specifically, in 
the course of dismissing the plaintiffs' First Amendment argument, the judge in 
Fields remarked that the plaintiffs "are not members of the press."29 This fact of 
non-press status, the Article argues, should be irrelevant regarding whether re­
cording police is protected expression. Yet, it is a point Judge Kearney reiterated 
in his March 2016 decision, writing that"[ w ]e do not view our role as expressing 
an opinion on the First Amendment in any other context involving other inter­
ests, such as the press or seeking to petition the government. We review only 
whether these facts constitute the required expressive conduct equal to a citizen's 
'speech."'30 This suggests, even more clearly, that Judge Kearney distinguishes be­
tween citizens' freedom of speech under the Speech Clause of the First Amend­
ment and journalists' freedom under the Press Clause. In other words, for Judge 
Kearney, a member of the press might be protected while silently recording po­
lice, but a citizen such as Amanda Geraci is not. 
If the right to record exists, however, then it surely is a citizen's right, not 
merely a journalist's right. Specifically, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in Glik v. Cunnijfe31 opined in 2011: 
[C]hanges in technology and society have made the lines between
private citizen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw. The pro­
liferation of electronic devices with video-recording capability means
that many of our images of current events come from bystanders with
a ready cell phone or digital camera rather than a traditional film
crew, and news stories are now just as likely to be broken by a blogger
at her computer as a reporter at a major newspaper.32 
Finally, the Article concludes by calling on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit to reverse Fields,33 which the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) is, in fact, appealing. 34 This is particularly important because, as the Ar­
ticle points out in Part I, the Third Circuit today fails to recognize a qualified 
First Amendment right to film police in public places. 
28. See infra Part IV.
29. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 2016).
30. Geraci v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-5264, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32146, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 14, 2016) (emphasis added).
31. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
32. Id. at 84.
33. See infra Conclusion.
34. See generally Fields v. City rf Philadelphia, ACLU OF PA., http://www.aclupa.org/our­
work/legal/legaldocket/fields-v-city-philadelphia [https://perma.cc/E8HG-RMJTJ (noting that
"[ t ]he ACLU has appealed this ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit").
236 
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CUITINGAGAINSTTHEGROWINGGRAIN OFAUTHOR ITY: 
RETICENCE IN FIELDS AND T HE THIRD CIRCUIT TO RECOGNIZE A 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIG HT TO RECORD 
A 2015 law journal article asserts that "videotaping the police has become a 
cultural phenomenon with the aid of advances in technology."35 Yet, the U.S. 
Supreme Court never has squarely addressed if there is a First Amendment right 
to record images of police performing their jobs in public.36 
That is both unfortunate and problematic. Every week, according to Mick­
ey Osterreicher, general counsel of the National Press Photographers Associa­
tion, multiple incidents occur "in which police either harass, interfere or arrest 
citizens-not journalists-for shooting video."37 For example, a U.S. Marshal in 
April 2015 grabbed and smashed the smartphone of non-journalist Beatriz Paez 
in South Gate, California, as she peacefully filmed several law enforcement offi­
cials working on a public sidewalk in a residential neighborhood.38 
Several federal appellate circuits, however, "have held that private citizens 
have a First Amendment right to record law enforcement activities."39 Indeed, as 
Professor Marc Jonathan Blitz and his colleagues pointed out in 2015 in the Wil­
liam & Mary Law Review, "in a series of recent cases on video recording of police 
encounters, federal courts have increasingly recognized such a right."40 One fed­
eral district court in August 2015 concluded, in fact, that "most courts of appeal 
... have acknowledged that the First Amendment broadly protects the right to 
35. Alexander Shaaban, Officer! You Are on Candid Camera: Why the Government Should Grant Private
Citizens an Exemption From State Wiretap Laws When Surreptitiously Recording On-Duty Officers in
Public, 42 W. ST. U. L. REV. 201,204 (2015).
36. See Garcia v. Montgomery Cnty., No. TDC-12-3592, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151059, at *23 (D.
Md. Nov. 5, 2015) (noting that the plaintiff"asserts that the officers violated his First Amendment
right to video record police officers in the routine public performance of their duties. The United
States Supreme Court has not yet spoken on whether this is a right protected by the First
Amendment.").
37. Frank Ehman, Citizens Taking Video of Police See Themselves Facing Arrest, SAN DIEGO UNION­
TRIBUNE (Aug. 29, 2015, 8:48 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/
aug/29/citizens-taking-video-of-police-see-themselves/ [https://perma.cc/CVE8-4DHS].
38. Steve Almasy, Marshal Caught on Cell Phone Video Smashing a Woman's Cell Phone, CNN (Apr. 22,
2015, 10:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/22/us/california-marshal-smashed-phone
[https://perma.cc/F4R7-ZF62]; Joseph Serna, With Smartphones Everywhere, Police on Notice They
May Be Caught on Camera, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-feds-probe-video-phone-in-south-gate-201504 21 -story.html
[https://perma.cc/6MAM-2WUP].
39. Robert H. Gruber, Commercial Drones and Privacy: Can We Trust States With "Drone Federalism"?,
21 RICH.J.L.&TECH. 1, 131 (2015).
40. Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 49, 85-86 (2015).
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make audio or visual recordings of police activity."41 This Part briefly reviews 
some of these cases, providing context for better understanding the February 
2016 Fields opinion at the heart of this Article. A more comprehensive, in-depth 
analysis of the other cases is available elsewhere.42 
At the federal appellate court level, the U.S. Court of Appeals recognized a 
qualified First Amendment right to record police in public places in 2011 in Glik 
v. Cunnijft.43 The right is qualified-not absolute-because it "may be subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."44 The recording in Glik oc­
curred in Boston Common, where three police officers were arresting a man.45 
The First Circuit declined to specify what might constitute a reasonable re­
striction in this situation.46 
Three years later, the First Circuit extended the right to record police 
beyond park settings like Boston Common to roadside traffic stops in Gericke 
v. Begin.47 Although holding that "a traffic stop does not extinguish an indi­
vidual's right to film," the First Circuit noted the qualified nature of this
right, pointing out that "[r]easonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them."48 It suggested
that safety concerns, such as when the individual pulled over is armed, might
justify restricting the right to record.49 Finally, the appellate court drew a clear
line between recording and interfering, opining that a "police order that is specifi­
cally directed at the First Amendment right to film police performing their du -
ties in public may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer can
reasonably conclude that the filming itself is inteifering, or is about to inteifere,
with his duties."50 
41. Order on Pending Motions, Hudkins v. City oflndianapolis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103039, at
*45 ( S.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2015).
42. See generally Clay Calvert, The First Amendment Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places: The
Unreasonable Slipperiness of Reasonableness & Possible Paths Forward, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1 3 1
( 2015) (providing a review of the case law in this area through May 2015).
43. 655 F.3d 78 ( 1st Cir. 201 1). 
44. Id. at 84.
45. Id. at 79-80. 
46. See id. at 84 ("[T]he right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions .... We have no occasion to explore those limitations here, 
however." (citation omitted)). 
47. 753F.3dl,7( 1stCir.2014).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
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Other federal appellate circuits recognizing a qualified right to film police in 
public venues include the Seventh,51 Ninth,52 and Eleventh Circuits.53 Signifi­
cantly, and as noted above,54 the Seventh Circuit ruling in ACLU if Illinois v. Al­
varez55 is clear that the act if recording-not just the end product of that 
recording-falls within the ambit of First Amendment protection. 56 And, unlike 
Fields, none of the abovementioned cases or circuits require the act of recording 
to be done with the intent to challenge or to criticize police conduct or to be ac­
companied by spoken words in order to constitute speech. 
Most recently, a federal district court in Maryland, which falls within the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,57 concluded in November 2015 
"that video recording of police activity, if done peacefully and without interfering 
with the performance of police duties, is protected by the First Amendment."58 
The decision is particularly important because it provides a legal beachhead for 
the Fourth Circuit to recognize such a right-something that, as U.S. District 
Judge Theodore Chuang observed in Garcia v. Mongomery County, it "has not 
addressed in a published opinion."59 
51. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 600 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that an Illinois
"eavesdropping statute restricts a medium of expression-the use of a common instrument of
communication-and thus an integral step in the speech process. As applied here, it interferes
with the gathering and dissemination of information about government officials performing their
duties in public.").
52. See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing a "First Amendment
right to film matters of public interest" in the context of a man who "was videotaping people on the 
streets of Seattle," including police, during a public protest march). 
53. See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing "a First 
Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions, to photograph or 
videotape police conduct").
54. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
55. 679 F.3d. 583. 
56. See id at 595 (opining that "[t]he act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily
included within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the
right to disseminate the resulting recording," and adding that"[ t ]he right to publish or broadcast an 
audio or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of
making the recording is wholly unprotected").
57. See About the Court, U.S. CT. OFAPPEALSFOR THEFOURTHCIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/
about-the-court [https://perma.cc/HWY4-2H9F] (noting that the Fourth Circuit "hears appeals
from the nine federal district courts in Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina").
58. Garcia v. Montgomery Cty., No. TDC-12-3592, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151059, at *27 (D. Md.
Nov. 5, 2015).
59. Id at*25.
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Also in 2015, a federal court in the Western District ofTexas60 and one in 
the Southern District of New York61 found that there is a qualified First 
Amendment right to film police doing their jobs in public venues. Unfortunate­
ly, the decision by U.S. District Judge P. Kevin Castel of the Southern District of 
New York suggests-in accord with Judge Kearney's February 2016 observation 
in Fields that the plaintiffs in that case were not members of the press62-that this 
right is held only by "a journalist who is otherwise unconnected to the events rec­
orded."63 This facet of Judge Castel's opinion is critiqued in greater detail later in 
PartIV.64 
Against this growing spate of judicial authority, however, stands the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit-the circuit within which the district 
court in Fields v. City if Philadelphia sits. In 2015, Judge William Yohn Jr. of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania-the same district in which Fields is being liti­
gated-observed, somewhat apologetically, that: 
Whether the Third Circuit will eventually decide to follow what ap­
pears to be a growing trend in other circuits to recognize a First 
Amendment right to observe and record police activity is, of course, 
not for this court to decide, even if there are good policy reasons I adopt 
that change. 65 
The emphasized portion of this quotation implies that while Judge Yohn 
believed there were solid justifications for recognizing a right to record, he felt 
somewhat hamstrung by Third Circuit precedent from doing so. Specifically, the 
Third Circuit in 2010 in Kelly v. Borough efCarlisle66 concluded that "the right to 
videotape police officers during traffic stops was not clearly established"67 in May
2007 when the incident at the heart of Kelly occurred.68 It explained "there was 
insufficient case law establishing a right to videotape police officers during a traf­
fic stop to put a reasonably competent officer on 'fair notice' that seizing a camera 
60. See Buehler v. City of Austin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878, at *25 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015)
(holding that the "the right to photograph and videotape police officers as they perform their
official duties was clearly established" in 2012 when the three incidents in question took place).
61. Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding "that the
right to record police activity in public, at least in the case of a journalist who is otherwise
unconnected to the events recorded, was in fact 'clearly established' at the time of the events alleged
in the complaint" on November 15, 2011).
62. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
63. Higginbotham, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 380.
64. See infra Part IV.
65. Montgomery v. Killingsworth, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7152, at *41 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Jan.21, 2015)
(emphasis added).
66. 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010).
67. Id. at 263.
68. See id. at 251 (noting that the recording occurred on May 24, 2007).
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or arresting an individual for videotaping police during the stop would violate the 
First Amendment."69 Because the right to record was not clearly established in 
May 2007, the defendant police officer escaped monetary liability70 under the 
doctrine of qualified immunity. 71 
Throwing a small judicial bone to the First Amendment right to record, 
however, the Third Circuit in Kelly noted that "even insofar as it is clearly estab­
lished, the right to record matters of public concern is not absolute; it is subject to 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."72 Additionally, the appellate 
court specified that while it previously had "not addressed directly the right to 
videotape police officers,"73 it had, in a 2005 case called Gilles v. Davis,74 "hypoth­
esized that 'videotaping or photographing the police in the performance of their 
duties on public property may be a protected activity."'75 
Thus, when Judge Kearney surveyed the legal landscape of the Third Cir­
cuit in his February 2016 ruling in Fields, he found that "[w]hile acknowledging 
activities observing and recording the police may be protected, our Court of Ap­
peals has never held speech unaccompanied by an expressive component is always 
afforded First Amendment protection."76 He therefore reasoned that the only 
way in which image recordation constitutes speech within the confines of the 
First Amendment is if the act of recording is "'expressive' or otherwise 'critical' of 
the government."77
In summary, the Third Circuit and, within it, the Eastern District of Penn­
sylvania (the venue for Fields), find themselves lagging behind other federal 
courts in endorsing a qualified First Amendment right to film police doing their 
jobs in public places. The next Part of this Article illustrates that the district 
court's effort in Fields to separate the conduct of speech creation (the act of 
69. Id. at 262.
70. See id. at 263 (concluding that "Officer [David] Rogers was entitled to qualified immunity on
[Brian] Kelly's First Amendment claim").
71. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (observing that "[q]ualified immunity shields 
federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at 
the time of the challenged conduct"); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (observing
that "[q]ualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right").
72. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262.
73. Id. at 260.
7 4. 427 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005). 
75. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260 (emphasis added) (quoting Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197,212 n.14 (3d Cir.
2005)).
76. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 2016).
77. Id. at *13. 
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recording) from the end product of the process (the videos and images) is ex­
tremely problematic. 
II. SPEECH-FACILITATING CONDUCT: PROTECTING THE PROCESS OF
MAKING EXPRESSION, NOT JUST THE FINAL PRODUCT 
There is a fundamental dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence be­
tween speech and conduct.78 Yet, conduct is necessary to produce speech. Pro­
fessor Wesley Campbell notes that "the Supreme Court has recognized some 
First Amendment protection for the speech process, and not merely the expres­
sive end product."79 Campbell cites the Court's observation in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission80 that "[l]aws enacted to control or suppress speech 
may operate at different points in the speech process."81 The initial point in the 
"speech process," is the act of creating the speech itsel£ The macro-level issue 
thus becomes, as Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat wrote in 2015, "whether, and if so 
to what extent, the First Amendment protects the antecedent act of producing 
speech, not just the eventual communication."82 
An area in which courts increasingly recognize that the antecedent process 
of speech creation merits First Amendment protection equal to that of the speech 
product is the conduct of creating a tattoo. A trio of cases over the past six years 
illustrates this trend. Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit in December 2015 held that "tattooing is artistic expression protected by 
the First Amendment."83 In reaching this result, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned 
that: 
Protected artistic expression frequently encompasses a sequence of 
acts by different parties, often in relation to the same piece of work. 
The First Amendment protects the artist who paints a piece just as 
surely as it protects the gallery owner who displays it, the buyer who 
purchases it, and the people who view it.84 
78. See Randall P. Bezanson, Is There Such a Thing as Too Much Free Speech?, 91 OR. L. REV. 601,601
(2012) (emphasizing that the First Amendment guarantee of free speech traditionally "has rested
on two fundamental boundaries: speech versus conduct and liberty versus utility''); Martin H.
Redish, Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic Skepticism and the Theory of Free 
Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 700 (2015) (addressing "the fundamental distinction between
speech and conduct").
79. Campbell, supra note 23, at 4.
80. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
81. Id. at 336.
82. Bhagwat, supra note 26, at 1034.
83. Buehrlev. City of Key West, 813 F.3d 973,978 (11th Cir. 2015).
84. Id. at 977.
242 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 230 (2016) 
The Eleventh Circuit added that "[a] regulation limiting the creation of art cur­
tails expression as effectively as a regulation limiting its display. The government 
need not ban a protected activity such as the exhibition of art ifit can simply pro­
ceed upstream and dam the source."85 
The Supreme Court of Arizona reached a similar conclusion, predicated on 
comparable reasoning, in 2012 in Coleman v. City ifMesa.86 In holding that "the 
process of tattooing is expressive activity"87 and that "the process of tattooing is 
protected speech,"88 Arizona's high court reasoned that "the art of writing is no 
less protected than the book it produces; nor is painting less an act of free speech 
than the painting that results."89 
Both the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Buerhle v. City if Key West and the 
Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in Coleman v. City if Mesa build on the foun­
dation laid by the Ninth Circuit in 2010 in Anderson v. City if Hermosa Beach.90 
The Ninth Circuit in Anderson reasoned that: 
Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever drawn a distinction 
between the process of creating a form of pure speech (such as writ­
ing or painting) and the product of these processes (the essay or the 
artwork) in terms of the First Amendment protection afforded. Alt­
hough writing and painting can be reduced to their constituent acts, 
and thus described as conduct, we have not attempted to disconnect 
the end product from the act of creation.91 
The Ninth Circuit thus held that"[ t]he tattoo itse!f, the process of tattooing, and 
even the business of tattooing are not expressive conduct but purely expressive ac­
tivity fully protected by the First Amendment."92 
Of particular importance above is the conclusion that tattooing is pure 
speech, not merely expressive conduct. This finding obviates the need to apply 
the two-part symbolic speech analysis under Spence to determine if conduct rises 
to the level of speech for purposes of the First Amendment.93 This logic in An­
derson, of course, stands in opposition to the district court's observation in Fields 
that the process of recording a video of police in public places "is only afforded 
85. Id.
86. 284 P.3d 863 (Ariz. 2012).
87. Id. at 870.
88. Id. at 871.
89. Id. at 870.
90. 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).
91. Id. at 1061-62.
92. Id. at 1060.
93. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing the Spence test).
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First Amendment protection if we construe it as expressive conduct."94 This re­
quirement-that the plaintiffs in Fields first needed to meet the test for expressive 
conduct-thwarted their First Amendment argument under Spence. The first 
part of the test for expressive conduct under Spence requires an "intent to convey a 
specific message."95 Here, the plaintiffs stated they intended to record to merely 
observe and to take images of an interesting, cool scene96-not to convey a specif­
ic message. Thus, the plaintiffs in Fields did not even satisfy the first prong of 
Spence because they had no intent to convey a message (an image), merely to cap­
ture one. 
They should never have been required to satisfy the Spence test, however, 
because legally separating the unprotected act of pushing record from the speech 
product it immediately creates is disingenuous. The act of recording speech­
visual images, in Fields-is a necessary condition for the pure speech product 
(photos or videos) to exist in the first place. Furthermore, not only is the conduct 
of pushing the record button a necessary condition for producing the speech prod­
uct, but it also is the immediate antecedent act that triggers speech production. In 
other words, no intervening conduct by a human between pushing record and 
capturing the image is needed to produce the image. Finally, in addition to the 
close physical proximity between human conduct and image creation, the temporal 
proximity between pushing record and the resultant image being captured is near­
ly instantaneous on a smartphone. All of these facts suggest it is somewhat disin­
genuous to erect a legal barrier separating the unprotected act of pushing record 
from the speech product it immediately creates. 
There is yet another reason why imposing the expressive-conduct require­
ment of an intent "to communicate a particularized message"97 upon the act of re­
cording, as in Fields's reasoning, is misguided. In 2011, University of 
Pennsylvania Professor Seth Kreimer argued that "in the emerging environ­
ment of pervasive image capture, the difference between capturing images and 
disseminating images erodes rapidly."98 Illustrating how the mere recordation 
of information constitutes speech, regardless of an intent to transmit that 
94. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 2016) (emphasis added).
95. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1118 (5th ed.
2015).
96. See supra notes 7 -11 and accompanying text.
97. Diahann DaSilva, Playing a "Labeling Game": Classifying Expression as Conduct as a Means of
Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L. REV. 767, 774 (2015).
98. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the
Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335,376 (2011).
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information-such as, to convey a particularized message with it, per Spenc�to 
an audience, Kreimer writes that: 
We would recognize police seizure of, or prosecution for, drafts oflet­
ters or manuscripts as an interference with freedom of expression, 
even if the seizure occurred before the writer had decided to send or 
publish them, though no designated "audience" had been deprived of 
their content. So, too, image capture before the decision to transmit 
images falls within the scope of the emerging medium.99 
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment's 
words "speech" and "press" are not narrowly cabined by some literal meaning, but 
instead encompass certain penumbral rights. As the Court wrote in Griswold v. 
Connecticui1°0 more than a half-century ago,"[ t]he right of freedom of speech and 
press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the 
right to receive, [and] the right to read."101 Critically, the Court in Griswold add­
ed that "[ w ]ithout those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less se­
cure."102 Today, the right to record images might be considered another 
peripheral right. Indeed, without the peripheral First Amendment right to rec­
ord images today, the ability for the images to even exist would be nonexistent, 
not simply less secure. 
III. VIEWPOINT-BASED Focus ON SPEECH AND INTENT IN FIELDS:
ANOTHER STRIKE AGAINST THE RULING 
In Fields, plaintiffs Richard Fields and Amanda Geraci broadly asserted that 
"the mere act of observing and recording is entitled to First Amendment protec­
tion."103 Yet, when it came to framing the key issue before the court, the district 
court wrote-much more narrowly-that it was whether citizens "enjoy a First 
Amendment right to photograph police absent any criticism or challenge to police 
conduct."104
In addressing the issue of whether there is a First Amendment right to pho­
tograph police absent any criticism or challenge to police conduct, the district 
99. Id. at 377.
100. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. Id. at 482.
102. Id. at 482-83.
103. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *9 n.27 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 19, 2016).
104. Id. at *2. Judge Kearney added that he was "not addressing a First Amendment right to photograph
or film police when citizens challenge police conduct." Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
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court emphasized that neither Richard Fields nor Amanda Geraci "uttered any 
words to the effect he or she sought to take pictures to oppose police activity."105 
Furthermore, he wrote that "[ n ]either Fields nor Geraci assert they engaged in 
conduct 'critical' of the government; both assert they were only 'observing' police 
activity."106 The court emphasizes that criticism of police-found either in the
expressive conduct of the recorder or in the words spoken by the recorder-is es­
sential. It added that "Fields and Geraci essentially concede they spoke no words 
or conduct expressing criticism of the police before or during their image cap­
ture."107 Judge Kearney even dropped a footnote to point out that "[n]either 
Fields nor Geraci allege or offer evidence their conduct expressed criticism of po­
lice activity."108 And, ultimately, Judge Kearney concluded that "photographing 
police without any challenge or criticism"109 does not constitute speech protected by
the First Amendment. 
This analysis, with its uncompromising requirement that recording must be 
accompanied by spoken words critical of the police or be done with an intent to 
criticize the police, is troubling for two key reasons. First, it suggests that citizens 
may be protected by the First Amendment when they record images of police, 
but only if they first announce, either through their words or their expressive ac­
tions, to the very same officers they are recording, that they are doing so to criti­
cize or challenge the officers' actions. This, of course, is not likely to go over well 
with the officers, who might very well order the recording stopped, seize the 
phone or camera, or otherwise obstruct the recording. 
Notably, plaintiff Richard Fields had his iPhone seized and thrown to the 
concrete-cracking its screen, in the process-by a Philadelphia police officer, 
and all Fields merely said to the officer was that he was standing on public prop­
erty, not interfering with any police investigation, and would not leave.110 One 
wonders what might have happened had he said something critical of the officer. 
As Carlos Miller, the founder and publisher of Photography is Not a Crime, 
bluntly put it, Judge Kearney held that "citizens do not have the First Amend­
ment right to record police in public. That is, unless those citizens are telling the 
cops to go fuck themselves. Then it's protected speech."111 Similarly, under the 
105. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at *22 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at*12 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at *9 n.27 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 
110. Complaint at 3 -4, Fieldsv. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2016).
111. Carlos Miller, Rookie Federal fudge in Pennsylvania Rules Citizens Do Not Have First Amendment
Right to Record Police, PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT A CRIME (Feb. 22, 2016),
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district court's requirement in Fields that speech or conduct critical of police must 
accompany the act of recording, Pennsylvania attorney Jordan Rushie contends, 
"If you want to film the police, also make sure to maybe yell at them too."112 
The bottom line is that imposing a requirement that citizens either must 
explicitly tell police they are recording them for purposes of criticism or that cit­
izens must somehow convey this same message through "expressive conduct" 
creates a profound chilling effect on the right to record. Few citizens would risk 
possible physical abuse at the hands a police officer by telling him, "I think what 
you are doing is wrong, so I'm going to record it." In other words, Judge Kearney 
adopted a test for speech that inherently chills it. 
The only requisite intent that should be necessary to consider as "speech" the 
conduct of filming police is the intent to observe their actions, in accord with the 
classic watchdog tradition of a free press.113 As Reggie Shuford, executive director 
of the ACLU of Pennsylvania, explained in response to Judge Kearney's opinion: 
Police have extraordinary power, and civilian recordings of police ac­
tions are essential to holding police accountable for how they use that 
power. The freedom to monitor the police without fearing arrest or 
retaliation is one of the ways we distinguish a free society from a po­
lice state.114 
Attorney Mary Catherine Roper, the deputy legal director for the ACLU of 
Pennsylvania who represents both Richard Fields and Amanda Geraci, added 
https:/ /photographyisnotacrime.com/2016/02/22/rookie-federal-judge-in-pennsylvania-rules­
citizens-do-not-have-first-amendment-right-to-record-police [https://perma.cc/7M2T-PTSQJ. 
112. Jordan Rushie, Apparently You Do Not Have a First Amendment Right to Photograph the Police in
Pennsylvania, PHILLY LAW BLOG (Feb. 22, 2016) https://phillylawblog.wordpress.com/
2016/02/22/apparently-you-do-not-have-a-first-amendment-right-to-photograph-the-police-in­
pennsylvania-unless-you-do-a-little-jig [https://perma.cc/DSH2-JD24].
113. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes the role of the press "as a watchdog of government activity."
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,447 (1991). As the late C. Edwin Baker explained, "the press
receives constitutional protection to be a voice independent of the government ( or, at least,
independent of the other three 'estates') in order to perform the crucial democratic tasks of
providing an independent source of vision and information, including performance of a watchdog 
role." C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 968 (2007). More simply put by Professor Vincent Blasi, the value of a
free press is that it "serve[s] in checking the abuse of power by public officials." Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977).
Watchdog journalism involves "documenting the activities of government, business, and other
public institutions in ways that expose little-publicized or hidden activities to public scrutiny." W.
Lance Bennett & William Serrin, The Watchdog Role, in THE PRESS 169, 169 (Geneva Overholser
& Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 2005).
114. ACLU-PA Issues Statement in Response to Copwatch Ruling, ACLU OF PA. (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.aclupa.org/news/2016/02/24/aclu-pa-issues-statement-response-copwatch-ruling
[https://perma.cc/FT2V-EX5E]. 
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that "in this day and age, frankly, the ability to record police is such an important 
part of our move to ensure that our police are accountable."115 
Roper's words are not empty rhetoric regarding the link between the ability 
to record police and holding them accountable. In fact, it was a citizen-taken vid­
eo of a white police officer Michael Slager shooting an unarmed African Ameri­
can Walter Scott multiple times in the back in North Charleston, South 
Carolina, in 2015 that now provides the critical evidence for holding Slager le­
gally accountable for murder at his trial slated for October 2016.116 As Mark 
Berman wrote in the Washington Post, the video of the Scott shooting taken by 
barber Feidin Santana while walking to work demonstrates "the acute power of 
video to establish evidence of police brutality, even when the officers say they 
have done nothing wrong."117 In brief, attorney Roper's remarks in the aftermath 
of Fields about the link between recording of police and holding them accounta­
ble rings profoundly true. 
The second and, perhaps, even more troubling aspect of the district court's 
decision is that it embraces a viewpoint-based test. Specifically, Judge Kearney's 
ruling "means that only photos and videos of police taken in the spirit of protest 
or meant to express some other message of disapproval are protected."118 Con­
versely, recordings made with the intent to laud or to praise the police seemingly 
would not constitute speech. In other words, the specific viewpoint and intent 
adopted by a person recording police appears to be outcome determinative of 
First Amendment protection under the district court's analysis. 
That is exceedingly disturbing because, as Professor Joseph Blocher 
writes, "the prevention of viewpoint discrimination has long been considered 
the central concern of the First Amendment."119 In particular, viewpoint-based 
discrimination is a subcategory of content-based regulations,120 and it is almost 
115. Daniel Craig, Pa. ACLU to Appeal Ruling Against First Amendment Right to Film Police, PHILLY 
VOICE (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.phillyvoice.com/pa-aclu-appealing-ruling-against-first­
amendment-right-film-police [https://perma.cdKV 64-RVZ2].
116. See Alan Blinder & Timothy Williams, Ex-South Carolina Officer Is Indicted in Shooting Death of
Black Man, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/us/former-south­
carolina-officer-is-indicted-in-death-of-walter-scott.html [https://perma.cdV5P5-95AH].
117. Mark Berman, Shooting in South Carolina Emphasizes Power of Video Footage, WASH. POST (Apr. 
9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/shooting-in-south-carolina-emphasizes­
power-of-video-footage/2015/04/09/ 4 7582818-dfD0-11e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html
[https://perma.cd6SG9-Z6EB].
118. Brentin Mock, The Right to Film Cops Comes Into Question, CITYLAB (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.citylab.com/crime/2016/02/there-is-no-first-amendment-right-to-film-cops/470670
[https://perma.cdCC8L-LPYH].
119. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 696 (2011). 
120. See Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Difovored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado,
the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for an Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U. L. 
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always unconstitutional as "an egregious form of content discrimination."121 As 
the U.S. Supreme Court wrote twenty-one years ago, "[w]hen the government 
targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the 
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant."122
Indeed, the Court has further observed that "[a]t the heart of the First 
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself 
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our 
political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal."123 Judge Kearney's analysis 
in Fields, however, turns this principle on its head by mandating that citizens ex­
press and adopt a specific sentiment-one criticizing or challenging police during 
the act of recording-if they seek shelter under the blanket of First Amendment 
protection. 
In contrast to either viewpoint-based or content-based regulations,124 as 
Professor John Fee writes, "content-neutral speech regulations are subject to a 
more lenient First Amendment standard,"125 namely intermediate scrutiny.126
Professor Seth Kreimer notes the importance of the content-neutrality doctrine 
at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court, observing that: 
The Roberts Court has adverted to content neutrality as a defining el­
ement ef First Amendment doctrine in no less than twenty-two of the 
thirty-seven free expression cases it has decided on the merits over 
the last eight years, and virtually all of the decisions of recognized 
public consequence. Majority opinions regularly declaim that 
REV. 179, 195 (2001) (calling viewpoint discrimination "a subset of content discrimination"). 
Content-based regulations typically are valid only if they survive strict scrutiny review, which 
requires that a law "is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve 
that interest." Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); see United States v. 
Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting that a content-based speech restriction 
"can stand only ifit satisfies strict scrutiny," and asserting that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based 
on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest"). 
121. Rosenberger v. Rector ofthe Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,829 (1995).
122. Id.
123. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,641 (1994).
124. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) ("Government regulation of speech is
content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or 
message expressed."). 
125. John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2005). 
126. See Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable
Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. &POL 'y 131, 131-32 (2008) (asserting that "the Court has devised tests to
review content-based and content-neutral regulations (strict scrutiny for content-based regulations, 
a more lenient intermediate scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral)"). 
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"content-based" restrictions on speech are presumptively unconsti­
tutional.127 
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Writing recently, Professor Corey Brettschneider explains that "[t]he doctrine of 
viewpoint neutrality is central to First Amendment jurisprudence. It requires the 
state to not treat speech differently based on a speaker's political or philosophical 
opinions."128 
The intent of Amanda Geraci was, as noted earlier, simply to observe police 
action.129 The intent to observe-an intent, in other words, to record while not 
taking sides or adopting a particular viewpoint-fully embodies the principle of 
content neutrality. It thus is quite ironic that the district court would deny 
Geraci-a neutral observer-First Amendment protection because she chose not 
to adopt an antigovernment viewpoint. 
In summary, Judge Kearney's analysis requiring citizens to announce to the 
police or to demonstrate through their expressive conduct that they intend to 
challenge and criticize police action is not only impractical in operation, but also 
conflicts with long-standing principles against viewpoint-based government reg­
ulations. The district court should not mandate a citizen to adopt a particular 
viewpoint in order to be protected by the First Amendment. 
IV. WHOSERIGHTISITANYWAY?DISTINGUISHINGBETWEEN
CITIZENS AND THE PRESS 
In ruling against Richard Fields and Amanda Geraci, Judge Kearney point­
ed out that "[t]hey are not members if the press. Each engaged in activity they per­
sonally described as non-confrontational 'observing' and 'recording."'130 Perhaps 
sub silentio in this observation lurks the notion that if Fields and Geraci had been 
members of the press-if they had silently observed police as professional jour­
nalists-then the outcome would have been different. Why else, in other words, 
even raise or interject into the legal mix the fact of their non-press status if it was 
not somehow relevant? 
Importantly, Judge Kearney is not the only federal judge to acknowledge 
different treatment of citizens and the press when it comes to the First 
127. Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA.J.
CONST. L. 1261, 1265-66 (2014) (emphasis added).
128. Corey Brettschneider, Value Democracy as the Basis for Viewpoint Neutrality: A Theory of Free Speech 
and Its Implications for the State Speech and Limited Public Forum Doctrines, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 603,
605 (2013).
129. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
130. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 2016).
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Amendment right to record police in public places. Judge P. Kevin Castel of the 
Southern District of New York in 2015 in Higginbotham v. City if New York131 
concluded "that the right to record police activity in public, at least in the case if a 
journalist who is otherwise unconnected to the events recorded, was in fact 'clearly es­
tablished' at the time of the events alleged in the complaint."132 
Latent in Judge Kearney's analysis in Fields and in Judge Castel's decision in 
Higginbotham suggesting the right to record cops is possessed by journalists, but 
not by citizens generally, is the related distinction between the Speech Clause and 
the Press Clause. The fork in the First Amendment road for those seeking to 
record police, at least in the courtrooms of Judges Kearney and Castel, perhaps 
goes something like this: 
• lf you are a non-journalist, then you go down the path if the Speech Clause. On
this path, it is not sufficient merely to silently observe in order to gain First
Amendment protection. One must instead, as a threshold matter, demon­
strate that one is actually engaging in "speech." This can be done either via
the spoken word (verbally criticizing or challenging police while simultane­
ously recording them) or by some form of expressive conduct (akin to flag
burning) that satisfies the Spence test for symbolic speech. Only after one
clears this hurdle will First Amendment "speech" protection apply.
• lf you are a member if the press, then your silent recording if police garners Press
Clause protection as a facet if the unenumerated right to gather news. Getting
on this path may not be easy, however, because determining who is a mem­
ber of the press or a professional journalist poses a vast problem with the di­
chotomy suggested by Judges Kearney and Castel-and one for which they
offer no solutions. Additionally, as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky points out,
the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings over the years-despite dicta in cases like
Branzburg v. Hayes133-"without exception, have failed to provide any First
Amendment protection for newsgathering. Indeed, the Court has declared
that there is no exemption for the press from general laws."134 This path to
protection is neither a smooth nor well-worn path, but rather quite rocky.
Professor Sonja West concurs in a 2014 article, artfully writing:
131. 105 F. Supp. 3d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
132. Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
133. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Court wrote in Branzburg that "without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681.
134. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding Aggressive
Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2000); see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663, 669 (1991) (describing a "well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news"). 
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If the Speech Clause is the Court's favorite child, the Press Clause 
has been the neglected one. During the same period that the 
Court has developed wide-ranging protections under the Speech 
Clause, it has all but failed to notice the Press Clause's existence, and 
when it has noticed, it has been with a mindset of skepticism and de­
featism.135 
251 
Ultimately, a distinction based on status of the recorder-ordinary citizen 
versus professional journalist-when it comes to the right to film police is fun­
damentally flawed in ways far beyond the definitional difficulties. For example, 
Professor William Lee of the University of Georgia cogently argues that "because 
the value of expression does not depend upon the identity of its source, efforts to 
separate the citizen journalists from the press are constitutionally flawed. Stated 
differently, the constitutional value and protection of expression does not depend 
upon whether it emanates from an institution recognized as the press."136 Indeed,
the value of the smartphone video-both to the criminal justice system and to the 
public at large-taken by citizen Feidin Santana of officer Michael Slager shoot­
ing Walter Scott in the back is as important as if it had been taken by a member 
of the press.137 
Similarly, Professor Erik Ugland has called on the U.S. Supreme Court to 
"abandon any suggestion that 'freedom of the press' implies anything other than 
the freedom if all citizens to seek out the news and to communicate it through me­
dia."138 Even more broadly, Ugland urged the Court to reject the notion that the 
"the Speech and Press Clauses be read to provide distinct sets of rights based on 
communicators' expertise, credentials, or institutional affiliations."139 Erasing the
Speech and Press Clause distinction would, in tum, do away with the fork-in­
the-First-Amendment-road problem described immediately above in the 
analyses of Judges Kearney and Castel. In summary, distinguishing between 
citizens and members of the press when deciding who possesses a First 
Amendment right to film police in public is unsound. 
135. Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2439 (2014).
136. William E. Lee, Citizen-Critics, Citizen Journalists, and the Perils of Defining the Press, 48 GA. L.
REV. 757, 771 (2014).
137. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing this video).
138. Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 3 DUKEJ. CONST. L. &PuB. POL 'y 113,189 (2008) (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 179.
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CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has never recognized a 
clearly established First Amendment right to film the police doing their jobs in 
public venues.140 The ACLU of Pennsylvania now is appealing Fields, 141 howev­
er, which provides the Third Circuit with a prime opportunity to finally join the 
First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits142 in embracing this constitutional 
right. 
In recognizing this right and in reversing the district court's ruling, the 
Third Circuit should also make several key points clear in order to facilitate and 
buttress the strength of the First Amendment right to record police. These 
points entail specifying that: 
1) The right belongs to all citizens, not just to members of the press or prefessional
journalists. Citizens armed with smartphones play a vital watchdog role today on 
police, monitoring police activities and often when journalists are not present to 
capture abuses of authority. The citizen-taken video of the shooting of Walter 
Scott described above makes that clear.143 Additionally, defining who constitutes 
a member of a select press class, at least for purposes of the right to record, is ex­
ceedingly difficult, further militating against drawing any citizen-versus-press di­
chotomy. 
2) There is no need for a citizen to hold a specific viewpoint about the police activi­
ty he or she is recording in order for the act if recording to constitute speech. The Third 
Circuit should remove the district court's requirement that citizens are only pro­
tected by the First Amendment if they record with the intent to challenge or to 
criticize police activity. An intent to observe the police-for whatever reason or 
purpose, and certainly not requiring an unconstitutional viewpoint-based rea­
son like the one suggested by Judge Kearney-should be sufficient to trigger First 
Amendment protection. 
3) A citizen's silence when recording police does not adversely affect the determina­
tion that the act if recording images if police is speech. To require a person to speak 
up when simultaneously engaged in the act of image capture and creation simply 
is unnecessary. A tattoo artist need not talk when she works to create a tattoo in 
140. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
141. See ACLU-PA Issues Statement in Response to Copwatch Ruling, supra note 114 (quoting Reggie 
Shuford, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Pennsylvania, for 
the proposition that "Judge Kearney's ruling is an outlier, and we intend to appeal it''). 
142. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (addressing these courts' recognition of qualified First 
Amendment right to record police in public places).
143. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
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order for the act of tattooing to constitute speech.144 Similarly, a citizen photog­
rapher need not speak while taking a picture to obtain First Amendment protec­
tion. 
4) There is no need to engage in expressive conduct under Spence when recording
in order to trigger First Amendment protection. The Third Circuit here should 
adopt the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that "[t]he act of making an audio or au­
diovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment's guaran­
tee of speech and press rights."145 
5) A citizen does not need to explain to police ef.ficers why he or she is recording
their activity. People should not be forced to tell government officials why they 
are engaging in the speech activity that is the recording of images. Just as the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a qualified First Amendment right to engage in 
anonymous speech rather than being forced to reveal one's identity and thereby 
risk either government or private reprisal, 146 so too must there be a right not to be 
compelled to reveal to police the reason why one is recording them and risk retali­
ation or directly incur their wrath at the end of a baton stick. 
In summary, the district court's ruling in Fields-that a person who is not a 
member of the press, but who nonetheless is recording the police, must either 
speak up or act up (expressive conduct) in a way that challenges and criticizes po­
lice in order to obtain speech protection under the First Amendment-is flawed 
for multiple reasons. This Article explored four such reasons. Now, the Third 
Circuit should recognize the flawed logic of the lower court in Fields and reverse 
the decision. In the process, the appellate court should embrace the five points 
set forth immediately above. 
144. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text (addressing the tattooing-is-speech cases).
145. ACLU oflll. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583,595 (7th Cir 2012). 
146. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,357 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional an
Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature, reasoning that
"[u]nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but
an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the
majority.").
